The SO Combat Manual

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Mail

  1. Bieregu v. Reno, 59 F.3d 1445 (3rd Cir. 1995)
    1. Prisoners do not forfeit their First Amendment rights to use of the mails.
    2. In the context of the First Amendment and prison mail, "censorship" means altering or withholding delivery of particular letter.

    Prison officials not entitled to qualified immunity in suit alleging constitutional violations by opening prisoners incoming legal mail outside his presence.

  2. Brewer v. Wilkinson, 3 F.3d 816 (5th Cir. 1993)
    Lemon v. Dugger, 931 F.2d 1465 (11th Cir. 1991)
    1. "Special Mail" may not be opened by prison officials outside the presence of the inmate.
    2. "Special Mail" is mail from federal prisoner directed to attorneys, designated state & federal officials, and representatives of news media, and it is not to be opened by prison officials.
    3. Prison official's interference with plaintiff's legal mail violates both plaintiff's constitutional right of access to the courts and his First Amendment rights of free speech.

  3. Collins v. Schoonfield, 344 F.Supp. 257 (D. Maryland 1972)
    Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1980)
    Officials could not determine what was, or was not, legal mail.

  4. Foster v. Basham, 932 F.2d 732 (8th Cir. 1991)
    Prison mail room policy of preventing inmate's access to telephone directory listings of attorneys sent to inmates through the mail was unconstitutional.

  5. Gramdgna v. Johnson, 846 F.2d 675 (11th Cir. 1987)
    Practice of allowing prisoner's mail to accumulate before forwarding it to prisoners unconstitutionally infringed on their right of access to the courts.

  6. Griffin v. Lombardi, 946 F.2d 604 (8th Cir. 1991)
    Phelps v. US Federal Government, 15 F.3d 735 (8th Cir. 1994)
    1. Prison inmates have a recognized First Amendment interest in receiving mail.
    2. Prisoners constitutional right to send and receive mail may be restricted only for legitimate penological interests.

  7. Hall v. Curran, 818 F.2d 1040 (2nd Cir. 1987)
    A pointed case on censorship and the inextricably meshed rights of both the writer and intended recipient of mail.

  8. Knop v. Johnson, 977 F2d 996 (6th Cir. 1992)
    Prisoners could not be required to designate particular attorneys in order to activate privileged treatment of their legal mail.

  9. Loggins v. Delo, 999 F.2d 364 (8th Cir. 1993)
    Letter by prison inmate to brother in which some unkind remarks were made about the female mail room officer did not implicate "security concerns," and thus, imposition of disciplinary action on inmate for such letter violated the First Amendment.

  10. Mayer v. State, 184 Ariz. 242
    A notice of appeal by a pro se inmate was deemed filed when it was properly addressed and delivered to prison authorities for forwarding to the clerk of the superior court.

  11. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 US 396, 40 L.Ed.2d 224, 94 S.Ct. 1800 (1974)
    1. The inmate must be notified of the rejection of a letter written by or addressed to him.
    2. The author must be given a reasonable opportunity to protest the decision.
    3. Complaints must be referred to a prison official other than the person who originally disapproved the correspondence.
    4. Mail censorship regulations violated the First Amendments protections of lawful expression.

  12. Turner v. Safley, 482 US 78, 96 L.Ed.2d 64, 107 S.Ct. 2254 (1987)
    Mail restrictions on inmate correspondence held not to violate the First Amendment (see case for the particulars).

  13. Van Cleave v. US, 854 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1988)
    Sizemore v. Williford, 829 F.2d 608 (7th Cir. 1987)
    Prisoners complaint that his daily newspaper were permanently withheld and intentionally never delivered by prison officials implicated his substantive rights as guaranteed by First Amendment.

  14. Wycoff v. Brewer, 572 F.2d 1260 (8th Cir. 1978)
    O'Donnell v. Thomas, 814 F.2d 524 (8th Cir. 1987)
    In both cases prison officials opened three (3) court letters and the appellate court either remanded the case for factual findings or declared the action unconstitutional.

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Mandamus

  1. Allied Chemical Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 US 33, 66 L.Ed.2d 193, 101 S.Ct. 188 (1980)
    Remedy of mandamus is a drastic one, to be invoked only in extraordinary situations.

  2. Doughty v. Underwriters At Lloyd's, London, 6 F.3d 856 (1st Cir. 1993)
    It is a prerequisite to mandamus relief that ruling below be palpably improper and that suitor's entitlement to claimed relief be plain as a matter of law.

  3. Mallard v. US Dist. Court For S. Dist. Of Iowa, 490 US 296. 104 L.Ed.2d 318. 109 S.Ct. 1814 (1989)
    In Re Glass Workers Local No. 173, 983 F.2d 725 (6th Cir. 1993)
    Mandamus may be issued when petitioner shows there is no other means available to obtain desired relief and that his right to issuance of the writ is clear and undisputable.

  4. Matter Of Continental Illinois Sec. Litigation, 985 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1993)
    One of less controversial functions of mandamus is to assure that lower court complies with spirit as well as letter of mandate issued to that court by higher court.

  5. Potomac Electric Power Co. v. ICC, 702 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir 1983)
    Congress has empowered federal courts to issue writ such as Mandamus if necessary to effectuate or prevent frustration of orders previously issued.

  6. US v. Gunderson, 978 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1992)
    Mandamus cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal.

  7. US v. Horn, 29 F.3d 754 (1st Cir. 1994)
    Advisory mandamus is appropriate when issue presented is novel, of great public importance, and likely to recur.

  8. Socer v. Scott, 942 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1991)
    Prisoner who alleges cause of action under the Mandamus Act need not rely upon implied or private right of action under any other statute.

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Marriage and Divorce

  1. 42 USC § 667 (b) (2)Federal child support and establishment of paternity act.
    Requires that state receiving federal funds allow a rebuttal presumption in judicial or administrative proceedings for the award of child support.

  2. Acuna v. Sullivan, 765 F.Supp. 510 (E.D. Arkansas 1991)
    1. Validity of marriage is determined by law of place where it was celebrated.
    2. Under Texas law, marriage is void if either party was previously married and the prior marriage is not dissolved.

  3. Barnes v. State Of Mississippi, 992 F.2d 1335 (5th Cir. 1993)
    State may enact abortion law calculated to inform woman's free choice, not hinder it.
  1. Bennett v. Bennett, 595 F.Supp. 366 (D.C. D.C. 1984)
    Where mother violated father's child custody rights under decree which was required to be recognized by the court, she could be made to compensate father for the harm done.

  2. Bruce v. Hartford Life & Accid. Ins., 907 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1990)
    Under Louisiana law, divorce actions abate on death of either party.

  3. Cooper v. State Of Utah, 684 F.Supp. 1060 (D. Utah 1987)
    Right to lawful marriage, without fear of criminal prosecution, is part of fundamental right to marry protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.

  4. Depuy v. Dupuy, 686 F.Supp. 568 (E.D. Virginia 1988)
    Under Virginia law, wife was entitled to recover attorney fees incurred in enforcing New York divorce judgment which required her former husband to make support payments.

  5. Hassan v. Lubbock Independent School Dist., 55 F.3d 1075 (5th Cir. 1995)
    Children do not shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse door.

  6. Holbert v. West, 730 F.Supp. 50 (E.D. Kentucky 1990)
    Generally, common law rule is that under age marriage of person over age seven is not "void" from onset but is merely "voidable" and valid until declared void by the court.

  7. Hullett v. Towers, Perrin, Forster & Crosby. Inc., 38 F.3d 107 (3rd Cir. 1994)
    Under Pennsylvania law, for purposes of interpretation. property settlement agreement is treated same as any other contract.

  8. In Re Marriage of Gilbert, 945 P.2d 238, 88 WA. App. 362 (Wash. App. Div. 1, 1997)
    You must show that to impose child support would be unjust or inappropriate in your particular circumstances. You must show that you are indigent. Due to being in prison, and that the amount you are being asked to pay is excessive. Most states mandate a support order of at least $25 for parents with less than $600 a month in combined net income. (Per child, $25). You should consider seeking a reduction in payments in light of this ruling through your respective county. See also: A.R.S. 25-100; 25-1012; 46-402.

  9. In Re Frawley, 112 BR 32 (D. Colorado 1990)
    Under Colorado law, two essential requirements must be met to establish a common law marriage; agreement between parties and cohabitation.

  10. In Re Soderling, 998 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1993)
    Under California law, all community property is liable for debts or either spouse incurred before or during marriage.

  11. In Re Spirtos, 56 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 1995)
    Under California law, when one party fails to perform his or her obligations under divorce decree, other party may sue him or her under contract principles for failing to perform.

  12. Labram v. Havel, 43 F.3d 918 (4th Cir. 1995)
    Generally, spouse may not recover for loss of consortium if he was not married to victim of primary wrong at time victim suffered her injuries.

  13. Mullins v. State Of Oregon, 57 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 1995)
    When child is abandoned by his parents and placed with state agency, state's paramount concern must be swift and suitable placement of the child.

  14. P.O.P.S. v. Gardner, 998 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1993)
    Rights to marry, have children, and maintain relationship with children are fundamental rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and thus, strict scrutiny is required of any statutes that directly and substantially impair those rights.

  15. Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. 1993)
    Parent's right to rear children without undue governmental interference is a fundamental component of due process.

  16. State v. Korzep, 165 Ariz. 490, 799 P.2d 831
    Defendant was convicted in the Superior Court, Yuma County, No. Cr-14519, Douglas W. Keddie, J., of manslaughter and she appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, 164 Ariz. 175, 791 P.2d 1058, and review was granted. The Supreme Court, Gordon, C.J., held that defendant was entitled to instruction that a person is justified in using deadly physical force against another to the extent that the person reasonably believes that the use of deadly physical force is necessary to prevent the other person's commission of aggravated assault, even when the other person is a member of the defendant's household. Vacated in part and remanded.

  17. Steen v. CIR, 923 F.2d 603 (8th Cir. 1991)
    Under Iowa law, property inherited both before and during marriage can be considered in determining a property settlement.

  18. Stubbs v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 653 F.Supp. 299 (S.D. Texas 1986)
    Under Texas law, granting of wife's petition for annulment of marriage on grounds of fraud made the marriage a nullity and restored the parties to the state which existed before the marriage.

  19. Trammel v. US, 445 US 40, 63 L.Ed.2d 186, 100 S.Ct. 906 (1980)
    A spouse can testify against the other party if the marriage is irretrievably broken.

  20. US v. Kapnison, 743 F.2d 1450 (10th Cir. 1984)
    Wife testified against her husband and the appellate court upheld her testimony.

  21. US v. White, 974 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1992)
    Public policy interests in protecting integrity of marriages and ensuring spouses freely communicate with one another underlie marital communications privilege.

  22. Waters v. Gaston County, N.C., 57 F.3d 422 (4th Cir. 1995)
    Federal Constitution embraces a fundamental right to marry.

  23. Willoughby v. Willoughby, 758 F.Supp. 656 (D. Kansas 1990)
    1. Under Kansas law, after petition for divorce is filed, district judge is permitted to issue an order which restrains the parties from disposing of property.
    2. A life insurance policy is property subject to division in divorce.

  24. Winston v. Delaware Children & Youth Service, 748 F.Supp. 1128 (E.D. Penn. 1990)
    Parents liberty interest in a relationship with their child continues even when custody has temporarily been granted to the state or another parent.

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Medical

  1. Boyd v. Knox, 47 F.3d 966 (8th Cir. 1995)
    Prison official's knowledge of deliberate indifference to prisoner's serious medical needs may be established by circumstantial evidence.

  2. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 US 97, 50 L.Ed.2d 251, 97 S.Ct. 285 (1976)
    Elementary principles of the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment establish the government's obligation to provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration.

  3. Fields vs, Gander, 734 F.2d 1313 (9th Cir. 1984)
    Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1378 (10th Cir. 1984)
    Individual has a constitutionally protected interest in making his own decision whether to accept or reject the administration of potentially dangerous drugs.

  4. Gill v. Mooney, 824 F.2d 192 (2nd Cir. 1987)
    Prison officials are more than merely negligent if they deliberately defy express instructions of prisoners doctors.

  5. Green v. Carlson, 446 US 14, 64 L.Ed.2d 15, 100 S.Ct. 1468 (1980)
    Suit against prison warden for money damages in a wrongful death.

  6. Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials, (1976, CA3 PA) 546 F.2d 1077
    Source of pre-trial detainees right to medical treatment is found in due process clause or an equal protection clause, with decisions interpreting cruel and unusual punishment clause of eighth amendment serving as a useful analogies.

  7. Johnson v. Clinton, 763 F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1985)
    Prison inmate stated a claim for cruel and unusual punishment by alleging that prison warden had denied him necessary surgery for a hernia and that he was being forced to work beyond his physical capacity, thus endangering his life.

  8. Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1990)
    Failure to respond to an inmates known medical needs raises an inference that there was a deliberate indifference to those needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

  9. Neely v. Fienstein, 50 F.3d 1502 (9th Cir. 1995)
    Mental hospital officials are liable to patient in civil rights action if they exhibit conscious indifference amounting to gross negligence.

  10. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 US 118 L.Ed.2d 479, 112 S.Ct. 1810 (1992)
    Felce v. Fiedler, 974 F.2d 1484 (7th Cir. 1992)
    There is a liberty interest in not being subjected to involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs except when there is an overriding justification for their use and a determination of medical appropriateness.

  11. Roba v. US, 604 F.2d 215 (2nd Cir. 1979)
    Prisoner has right not be forcibly transported when he is in a life threatening situation.

  12. Shannon v. Lester, (1975, CA6 Tenn) 519 F.2d 76
    Persons detained in custody are entitled to medical treatment when necessary on account of illness or injury, and refusal of prison authorities, with knowledge of condition, to provide medical treatment may constitute violation of due process clause of 14th amendment.

  13. Torraco v. Maloney, 923 F.2d 231 (1st Cir. 1991)
    Prison officials deliberate indifference to inmate's serious medical needs constitutes Eighth Amendment violation and gives inmate cause of action under §1983.

  14. US v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479 (4th Cir. 1987)
    Forcible medication with antipsychotic drugs implicates individual rights to freedom from physical invasion and freedom of thought as well as right to privacy protected by the Constitution and the common law.

  15. Weaver v. Clarke, 45 F.3d 1253 (8th Cir. 1995)
    Harris v. Coweta County, 21 F.3d 388 (11th Cir. 1994)
    Prison official violates Eighth Amendment by being deliberately indifferent either to prisoner's existing serious medical needs or to conditions posing substantial risk of serious future harm.

  16. Woodall v. Fote, 648 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1981)
    Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1980)
    Inmates must be provided with medically necessary mental health treatment.

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Miranda

  1. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 US 477, 68 L.Ed.2d 378, 101 S.Ct. 1880 (1981)
    Alston v. Redman, 34 F.3d 1237 (3rd Cir. 1994)
    Suspect who has requested presence of counsel cannot be questioned concerning any crime, not just one that got him in custody.

  2. Illinois v. Perkins, 496 US 292, 110 L.Ed.2d 243, 110 S.Ct. 2394 (1990)
    Illinois undercover law enforcement officer posing as fellow inmate was held not required to give MIRANDA warnings to suspect.

  3. Jocks v. Tavernier, 316 F.3d 128 (2003)
    The appropriate remedy for violations of Miranda rights is exclusion of the evidence at trial.

  4. Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 US 146, 112 L.Ed.2d 489, 111 S.Ct. 486 (1990)
    US v. Whaley, 13 F.3d 963 (6th Cir. 1994)
    Police cannot re-interrogate suspect who does not initiate discussion of his offense after invoking right to counsel.

  5. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966)
    A person being arrested must be told that he/she has the right to remain silent and that if they chose to do so an attorney will be appointed for them.

  6. Miranda v. AZ., No. 759 Argued Feb. 28 – Mar. 1, 1966 decided June 13, 1966 GO> 384 US 436
    When the accused is interrogated in a room cut off from the world or placed in a stressful condition the testimony gathered is inadmissible regardless of whether the accused was informed of his rights.

  7. Sanna v. Dipalo, 265 F.3d 1 (1st CIR 2001)
    When a person in police custody requests the presence of an attorney the authorities must cease interrogation.

  8. US v. Allee, 299 F.3d 996 (8th CIR 2002)
    Inquiry into defendant’s silence following Miranda warnings constitutes trial error. (This would also apply to right to counsel.)

  9. US v. Baker, 999 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1993)
    Due process requires that defendant's be able to exercise their constitutional right to remain silent and not be penalized at trial for doing so.

  10. US v. Bland, 908 F.2d 471 (9th Cir. 1990)
    Miranda warning given to defendant was inadequate where defendant was not informed that he had a right to have an attorney during questioning.

  11. US v. Bonner, 302 F.3d 776 (7th CIR 2002)
    A defendant’s right to silence, coupled with her right not to have any reference to her silence made at trial, exists even before defendant receives Miranda warnings.

  12. US v. Bowman, 907 F.2d 63 (8th Cir. 1990)
    Statement given by defendant before MIRANDA warnings could be used for impeachment.

  13. US v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196 (10th Cir. 1991)
    Once defendant invokes his right to remain silent, it is impermissible for the prosecution to refer to any Fifth Amendment rights which the defendant has exercised.

  14. US v. Butler
    Because of the inherently coercive nature of custodial interrogations, a person must be advised of his Miranda rights, prior to questioning.

  15. US v. Carpenter, 963 F.2d 736 (5th Cir. 1992)
    Fifth Amendment shields suspects from interrogation about any offense, charged or uncharged.

  16. US v. Carter, 953 F.2d 1449 (5th Cir. 1992)
    Use of the defendant's post - arrest silence for its substantive value is prohibited, as is its use for impeachment purposes.

  17. US v. Cordova, 990 F.2d 1035 (8th Cir. 1993)
    Reading of Miranda rights is required whenever a suspect is interrogated while in custody.

  18. US v. Covington, 783 F.2d 1052
    Defendant was charged with carnal knowledge of his 13-year-old daughter within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States. The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii, Samuel P. King, J., suppressed the defendant's statements. Government appealed. The Court of Appeals, Circuit Judge, held that the exclusionary rule of Miranda and Edwards does not apply to statements obtained by foreign law enforcement officers in violation of foreign law and, therefore, if an investigator was acting as a law enforcement officer of the Marshall Islands, rather than as a law enforcement officer of the United States, the exclusionary rule would not apply, but a determination was required as to whether the trustworthiness of the confession satisfied due process standards. Reversed and remanded.

  19. US v. Gelzer, 50 F.3d 1133 (2nd Cir. 1995)
    Statements made during custodial interrogation are generally inadmissible unless suspect has first been advised of his rights.

  20. US v. Ghent, 279 F.3d 1121
    Petitioner sought federal habeas corpus relief following affirmance, on direct appeal, 43 Cal.3d 739, 239 Cal.Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250, of his conviction by original jury for first-degree murder, attempted rape, and assault with intent to commit rape, and of death penalty imposed pursuant to second jury's verdict in special circumstances retrial. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California, William A. Ingram, Chief District Judge, denied petition. Petitioner appealed. The Court of Appeals, Reinhardt, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) admission of testimony in violation of Miranda violated petitioner's due process rights; (2) erroneous admission of psychiatrist's testimony did not have substantial or injurious effect on original jury's verdict; (3) erroneous admission of psychiatrist's testimony during special circumstances retrial warranted habeas relief; (4) jurors' brief glimpses of petitioner in restraints did not rise to level of due process violation; and (5) failure to give lesser-included instruction did not prejudice petitioner. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.

  21. US v. Henley, 984 F.2d 1040 (9th Cir. 1993)
    When officer has reason to know that suspect's answer may incriminate him, even routine questioning may amount to interrogation.

  22. US v. Hurst, 228 F.3d 751 (6th CIR 2000)
    Interrogation triggers the need to give Miranda warnings.

  23. US v. Johnson, 56 F.3d 947 (8th Cir. 1995)
    After giving Miranda warnings to suspect in custody, if suspect indicates in any manner. at any time, prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, interrogation must cease.

  24. US v. Little, 18 F.3d 1499 (10th Cir. 1994)
    There is no per se rule requiring police to advise detainee of right to refuse to answer questions (Authors Note: under NO circumstances volunteer information or respond to questioning without the presence of counsel).

  25. US v. Menesses, 962 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1992)
    Confession induced by assurance that there will be no prosecution is not voluntary.

  26. US v. Moreno Flores, 33 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 1994)
    Garcia v. Singletary, 13 F.3d 1487 (11th Cir. 1994)
    Defendant who is in custody must be given MIRANDA warnings before police officers may interrogate him.

  27. US v. Soto, 953 F.2d 263 (6th Cir. 1992)
    Defendant did not waive his MIRANDA rights by initiating conversation with police officer regarding how inventory of defendant's belongings following his arrest should be conducted.

  28. US v. Swint, 15 F.3d 286, 290 (3rd CIR 1994)
    Confession involuntary because defendant thought statements were off the record “proffer” and officers did not clearly inform defendant’s statements were on the record.

  29. US v. Waldemer, 50 F.3d 1379 (7th Cir. 1995)
    Defendant may not be convicted solely on his own uncorroborated admissions made after crime has ended.

  30. US v. Walton, 10 F.3d 1024 (3rd Cir. 1993)
    US v. Johnson, 42 F.3d 1312 (10th Cir. 1994)
    When Miranda violation is alleged to have occurred, burden of proof rests with government to prove validity of waiver by preponderance of evidence.

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Miscellaneous

  1. Article 2 § 26 AZ. Constitution: Bearing Arms.
    The right of the individual citizen to bare arms in defense of himself or the state shall not be impaired, but nothing in this section shall be construed as authorizing individuals or corporations to organize, maintain or employ an armed body of men.

  2. A.R.S. 13-103 Abolition of Common Law Offenses and Affirmation Defense; definition.
    A. All common law offenses and affirmative defenses are abolished. No conduct or omission constitutes an offense or an affirmative defense under this title or under another statute or ordinance.

    B. For the purpose of this section, “affirmative defense” means a defense that is offered and that attempts to excuse the criminal actions of the accused or another person for whose actions the accused may be deemed accountable. Affirmative defense does not include any justification defense pursuant to Chapter 4 of this title or any defense that either denies an element of the offense charged or denies responsibility including alibi, misidentification, or lack of intent.

  3. A.R.S. 11-261
    Authority to procure liability and errors and omission is insurance covering officers, agents and employees.

  4. US Bankruptcy became official in 1933. The road to bankruptcy began with contract between King of France and the 13 United States of North America. See www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon

  5. Oct. 28, 1977 US as a corporation declared insolvency.
    26 IRC 165 (g)(1); U.C.C. 1-201(23); CRS 39-22-103.5;
    Westfall v. Braley, 10 Ohio/88, 75 Am. Dec. 509
    Adams v. Richardson, 337 S.W. 2d 911
    Ward v. Smith, 7 Wall 447

  6. Since May 9, 1933, the US has been in a state of declared national emergency. Senate Resolution 9, 93rd Congress, 1st session, forward, 1973.

  7. 27 CFR vol. 1; 27 CFR 72, 11, page 1122-1123
    Any of the following types of crime (federal or state); Offenses against revenue laws; burglary; counterfeiting; forgery; kidnapping; larceny; robbery; illegal sale or possession of a deadly weapon; prostitution (including soliciting, procuring, pandering, white slaving, keeping a house of ill fame and like offenses); extortion; swindling and confidence games; and attempting to commit, conspiring to commit, or compounding any of the foregoing crimes. Addiction to narcotic drugs and use of marijuana will be treated as if such were commercial crime.

  8. ARC 610 Religious beliefs or opinions.
    Evidence of the beliefs or opinions of a witness on matters of religion is not admissible for the purpose of showing that by reason of their nature the witness’s credibility is impaired or enhanced. See:
    Art. 2 §2 AZ. Constitution
    Kelley v. Abdo, 209 (ARIZ. 521, 444 ARIZ. ADv. REP. 9, 105 P.3d 167, 2005 APP.Lex1511 (Ct. APP. 2005)
    State v. Rankovick, 159 ARIZ. 116, 765 P.2d 518 (1988)
    State v. Towery, 186 ARIZ. 168, 920 P.2d 290 (1996)

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